Israel's newest settlement, Maskiot

A lot’s been happening since my last post—too much to cover in the short time I have. Still, although I'd like to mention the stories about Belarus' and Georgia's squabbling over Russia's higher gas prices (well, lower subsidies), and Russia's un-hilarious potential scapegoating of Leonid Nevzlin, former Yukos boss, for the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko. But one story stands out for the moment.

Israel has established a new settlement (Maskiot) in the West Bank, north of the Jordan Valley, for settlers evicted from Gaza. This move has been criticised by both the EU and the US for going against international law (EU) and the roadmap (US). It’s not difficult to see why: The positioning of the settlement (map here) speaks more of annexation than security. The Jordan Valley is one of the most fertile parts of the region. The settlers, willing to make the desert bloom, will find it much easier there.

However, as far as security goes, Maskiot is far from the major settlement areas to the West of the West Bank. Instead, it lies further East, towards the Jordanian border. If this is about increasing Israel’s security then I fail to see how it works. If the aim is to prevent terrorist incursions from the West Bank into Israel, then I don't get it—instead of placing the settlement between the main Palestinian populations and Israel, Israel placed it on the other side. If it is somehow aimed at resisting flows of people and arms from Jordan, then it still fails—the settlement is not close enough to the border. Moreover, since when were settlers supposed to defend the Israeli nation? That’s the role of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Instead of increasing security, the settlement decreases it by presenting a high-profile target to terrorists, and by further stretching the IDF into hostile territory. Security is an excuse more than anything else.

So what's the real reason? If you check out the map here, you will see a line of minor settlement outposts through the Jordan Valley. These outposts, and the IDF’s protection of them, effectively cut off the Palestinians in the West Bank from their best source of food production, and often their best source of income alongside. Just in case you missed it so far, read this analysis of the Jordan Valley annexation by B’Tselem. Taken from a strategic perspective, this move shows a desire to cement Israel’s presence in the Jordan Valley, taking that fertile area, and its precious resource (water), for itself, whether short-term or within the scope of a long-term ‘settlement’ of the crisis. No other reason I’ve read or heard fits the facts. I'm not impressed.

Iran Nukes, Wider Implications

I'm busy doing very little after a tough couple of weeks between Prague, Amsterdam, Zurich, and have two Christmas Parties in the next two days, so I'm going to keep this short and just point you towards a few articles:

Firstly, Israel may be thinking in terms of an unofficial alliance with some key Sunni states, which are, in turn, considering developing nuclear technologies to counter Iran's development.

If you're interested in the announcement of those Gulf Sunni states that they will look into developing a nuclear energy program, here's some more about that, and on the current diplomatic moves to halt Iran's program.

Thirdly, here, here and here are some articles about the Iranian government-sponsored Holocaust(-denying) seminar in Tehran.

That's enough international relations news for the moment.

It's cold in Prague, but nice to be home. I was in Amsterdam all last week, without internet in my hotel. At least, they charged 20 Euros per day for wireless internet. Next time I'll stay in a hotel where I can connect using the iPass service that comes with Cisco's laptop.

Amsterdam was nice, I went to a couple of milongas, and had a productive week at Cisco's offices there. Lots to do now, of course, but the Christmas/New Year break will be welcome.

Which is stronger - the EU or Russia?

Russia's been in the news a lot recently, mostly over the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a Russian ex-KGB dissident granted political asylum in the UK. Before he died, Litvinenko squarely blamed agents acting for Putin's government. In response, Kremlin officials called the allegations "nonsense", and Putin himself warned against creating a political scandal, saying that the death was being used as a "provocation". Putin argued that nothing in the doctors' reports indicated an unnatural death, this being the day before doctors reported a major dose of polonium-210 as the cause of death. Polonium is incredibly difficult to get hold of, and very difficult to handle safely, so whoever is responsible had both a high level of support and access to materials usually only kept under high-security in a small number of nuclear facilities worldwide. The police in the UK are, of course, investigating the death, and British authorities have been speaking with the Russian ambassador.

This comes at a tricky time, just before an EU-Russia summit that already faced severe difficulties stemming from Russia's embargo on Polishproduce. [That embargo is allegedly for safety reasons, but more likely a tool pressurising Poland into allowing Russian energy firms to buy gas companies and pipelines running through the country.] The embargo, and Russia's refusal to lift it, gave Poland cause to veto the start of talks on creating a successor to the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In the only notable strengthening of the EU's stance on this issue, the EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, warned that Russia's impending ban on all EU meat, prompted by the accessions of Romania and Bulgaria, could jeopardise Russia's WTO bid next year.

At the same talks, Russia came down solidly against any break-up of Gazprom's monopoly in Russia as long as there's a disparity between local and global prices. As Russia's poor are not going to be able to afford gas at global prices any time soon, the timeframe here is indefinite. But of course - a break up of Gazprom, which is largely state-owned and which has been purchasing stakes in energy companies throughout the CIS and Europe, would limit Russia's power over its neighbours. In marked contrast, the EU announced plans to break up Europe's energy distribution market to foster competition.

As you can see, Russia has been taking a strong stance in its relations with the EU, while the EU has been fairly softly-spoken and has generally failed to act on Russia's human rights abuses, stifling of dissent, trade embargos on EU states and semi-imperial use of energy as a weapon. This may be due to the European's own perceptions of their weakness for Russian energy, gas in particular. But two articles this week counter that view. Firstly, in an opinion piece in the Times, Edward Lucas speaks out strongly for EU unity in response to Russian actions against members:

...[T]he West must stick together. Russia expertly plays off one country against another. British eurosceptics must drop their defeatist disdain for a common European foreign policy, especially in the field of energy security. Without it, we risk losing half the continent to the Kremlin’s new empire, one built on pipelines rather than tanks. Europe must dump its self-indulgent anti-Americanism and rebuild its alliance with an administration chastened and looking for friends.

That alliance’s big task will not be military defence, but diversifying energy supplies. We need new pipelines in the Balkans and the Caucasus to bring the oil and gas riches of the Caspian basin and Central Asia to European markets, bypassing Russia’s capricious, greedy and monopolistic oil and gas companies. We must also build more liquefied natural gas terminals, and interconnecting pipelines to hook up national gas grids. It sounds just as boring as the jargon of the last Cold War but it is just as important.

Similarly, we must give unflinching support to the countries in Russia’s viewfinder, such as Poland, Georgia and the Baltic states. They face hate campaigns in the Russian media, meddling in their energy supplies and arbitrary sanctions on their exports. All too often, the EU says that problems its new members have with Russia are “merely bilateral”. In future, the message must be: “If you mess with Estonia you mess with the whole of Europe.” These are brothers-in-arms and know a lot more about Russia than we do, and we have been slow to recognise it.

Secondly, in a widely unreported conference in Berlin, Roland Goetz of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs noted that while Europe depends on Russia for about 30% of its gas, Russia exports 80% of its gas to Europe. Moreover, the taxes from Gazprom make up a whopping 25% of the Russian government's tax revenue. Taking that into account, the EU could generally take a stronger line in all its dealings with Russia, as the Russians have a lot more to lose from any disruption in energy trade. Secondly, we can begin to understand just why Russia goes to the lengths it does with its neighbours (e.g. see here, and here) to keep control of its gas distribution to Europe: once the EU gains sufficient gas supplyies bypassing Russia, it can deal with the Russians without fear of energy-reprisals. That could mean a loss of revenue for Russia, but in this scenario the EU would probably continue to buy Russian gas, but would be strengthened by the ability to change suppliers in the event of disagreements with Russia. That's not something the Kremlin wants.

I'm Still Here

Just a little busy, that's all.

I have a new blog, for the milonga (tango dance) I run here in Prague. Check out my playlists here: Tango Imperial Playlists.

More Russian Scheming

Here.

Disgusting, ain't it?

With friends like these...

Catching up on the news after a long week, I'm surprised at how explicit things are becoming with Russian foreign policy. The diplomatic niceties are being stripped away as the obstacles between Russia and Europe multiply, from human rights and corruption to free speech and international belligerence (see here and here for the latest). The more I read, and this has been a trend going back years, the more I'm convinced that Russia is not a viable partner for the West, and will not be one for the foreseeable future. They will use their oil and gas as political weapons, and they won't open up their energy market for outside investment or sign the energy charter, both of which would soften that weapon. And they will support the expansion of that weapon, of course. I tend to focus on Russia's foreign policy, but a couple of weeks ago the Economist published this on Russia, concluding with reservations, that Russia's heading might be towards fascism. If you only read one of the links in this paragraph, in fact if you weren't going to read any of them, you should read that one.

So what should European states do? Well, the best they could do would be to allow relations to cool. If Russia doesn't want to open up its markets, then the EU should reciprocate. If Russia doesn't improve its protection of foreign investments, then foreign investments should not be encouraged, although they shouldn't be prohibited; let the market put a price on the risk and let that deter investment. If Russia bullies her neighbours, the Europeans could at least let the rest of the world know it disapproves, or at most could offer military (via NATO) and/or economic assurances to counter the threats. And, most importantly, if Russia oppresses its people, whether ethnic Georgians, journalists, citizens, economic migrants, or just people doing business, then the EU shouldn't be shy of raising its voice, instead of dirtying itself by implied association and allowing wiggle room for misdeeds.

North Korea's Test

I'll make this short—it's nearly my bedtime.

The point about brinkmanship is that you don't step off the edge. While some might say the real edge would be a resumption of the Korean war, I don't. The North Koreans don't have an option of going back to war. While they have a massive conventional military edge over the South with the military line-up along the border, their forces imply deterrence—i.e. they could do massive damage in retaliation (think missiles), but are in no state to mount an offensive campaign. Their 'mobile' forces are quite entrenched along the border, and their supplies and logistics during any campaign are questionable. War isn't a realistic 'brink', the nuclear test is.

Does this increase the chances of war? Not really. North Korea now has a greater deterrent—at least, it will once it's managed to make a warhead-sized bomb. So what has it gained? Well, China and Russia are pissed, America's very pissed, international counter-proliferation initiatives are now even weaker (because states that want the bomb know it's possible), and Iran and Japan now have more incentives to join the nuclear club. North Korea's all but lost its friends, further isolation and sanctions seem certain.

At the same time, the test might not be all it seemed. The relative smallness of the explosion implies either that a fairly low fraction of the plutonium—assuming the material was taken from the reactor at Yongbyon—fissioned, or that the explosion was indeed conventional, which is unlikely but possible. In any case, a second test is quite likely, both so they can improve their mechanisms, and so they can gather more data.

Not that that'll do them any good.

Just dance

The world's pretty ungovernable (North Korea, Iran), and right now I don't really care.

Thursday was my first time as DJ/organiser of the bimonthly Jam Cafe Milonga. I've taken this role over from Jan Chrostek, who's off to Congo again as an election observer (good luck...). It went well, was well-attended and the dancers enjoyed the music. Next one will be even better, with shorter sets—I'll aim for 15 minutes, down from 12. I'll also see about posting my playlist online a week before so people can review it—a first for Prague milongas.

OK, time to go to another milonga.

Bastards

Just in case anyone suspected the Russians might not be such sons of bitches....

Bowing to pressure, the Georgians released the spies on Monday, handing them over to Russia via the OSCE, after which Russia imposed a blockade (story here) on all transport and post between the countries. This was justified by some crap about preventing illegal money flows. The immediate effect will be pretty strong, with many Georgians supported by trade with Russia, or by wages sent back from family members working there.

Georgia on my mind

If you hadn't noticed, Georgia's facing a lot of crap once more from Russia (see the BBC, The Hindu, the IHT, and my blog entry from January). Georgian police arrested four Russian military servicemen for spying, and surrounded the Russia military headquarters in Tbilisi, demanding the handover of a fifth. The Georgians say they have video evidence showing these guys actively gathering sensitive information on military and energy facilities. The Russian government, naturally, denied everything. Then they started withdrawing their embassy staff, mobilising troops close to the Georgian border, and claimed that the planned military pullout from Russian bases in Georgia could not go ahead. The latter claim was based upon some bull about not having the ability to defend themselves during the pullout, but my guess is that Russia's been looking for an excuse to postpone the pull-out for a while.

The chances of an invasion are pretty low, but Russia really wants to prevent Georgia's shift towards the West, especially towards NATO, and will use any heavy-handed means possible, including scare-tactics, funding pro-Russian opposition parties, and supporting the break-away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If and when the Russian 'peacekeepers' do leave, I'd expect a Georgian attempt to retake control of those territories within a few years. Quite right, too: neither of those regions could stand up on their own economically, and both have more ethnic Georgians and Georgian-speakers than ethnic Russians. The simple truth is that Russia maintains its military presence there and spends money to support the regions as a means of pressure against Tbilisi.

The government in Moscow still sees the world in zero-sum terms: what's good for our enemies is bad for us, what's bad for our enemies is good for us. The idea that Russia's neighbours might actually welcome relations based upon openness and mutually-beneficial trade holds no sway in Russia. Relations with their smaller neighbours instead seem governed by the idea that they should instead bow to Russia's military power and leverage over energy distribution. Yet their over-reaction actually betrays their weakness, rather than their strength: They have no actual means to safeguard their 'spies', both now and in the future, and hope to scare the Georgians out of imprisoning these ones and arresting any more. They have a large, if ramshackle, military, and control the majority of the region's oil and gas, but that's it. Further economic sanctions are a possibility, but if they're applied to too many products and without good reasons, they could jeopardise Russia's accession to the WTO. Otherwise, Russian diplomacy is stunted by a lack of experience in open, quid-pro-quo negotiations. It doesn't look like that will change any time soon.

Lifestyle Changes

Unsurprisingly, things have changed a lot for me in the last few weeks—I'm working longer hours, have much less flexibility in the hours I work, and find myself more tired at the end of the day. What used to be a common 30-minute nap after work at the IIR has become an almost-mandatory 45-minute nap, followed by about 5 minutes of disorientation, after getting home from Cisco. Still, I don't mind too much, and things should ease up once I've become more familiar with everything going on at work; it's the non-stop learning and paying attention that knackers me. I do still usually have enough time to go out during the week to play football, dance tango, and do aikido, and I can still run with the Hash House Harriers fairly frequently, so I don't have too much to complain about.

But as a whole, my life's much less relaxed than it used to be. I used to be relaxed pretty much automatically, without thinking about it. Now I have to pay attention to my spare time, ensuring I relax (sleep) after work, and also that I get enough exercise (football and/or running), and aikido. Aikido doesn't sit in the same category as football and running—it takes less energy, but relaxes more, hour for hour, than anything else I know.

Of course I now have much less time to read the news, which is why I have no idea what the Pope said about Muslims (I heard a couple of people talking about it). But, just in case you have some free time and want to get a good overview for how things have been at Guantanamo Bay, read this. And, for those interested in the latest American hardline bullshitting on Iran, read this.

Sketchy update

I've been busy at Cisco (go figure...) preparing to become the facilitator of the EMER Incentives Council, which will go online in February. This meant going to Amsterdam to meet the facilitator of the Europe and Emerging Incentives Council to try to understand what it's all about. I won't go into detail, but this won't be easy, and will test my abilities.

Iran is dancing towards its nuclear goals, and no-one seems able to do much about it. Those who regularly read this blog may remember that I'm not as worried about a nuclear-armed Iran as most Westerners seem to be, but still, this isn't exactly a good thing.

Fat lot of good that did

I've spent the last couple of days catching up on all the news I've missed in the past week, which saw me canoeing on the Vltava with the Prague HHH for four days, then flying out to Manchester to see the family. In that time, we've finally had a ceasefire in Southern Lebanon, and the beginnings of an Israeli withdrawal and entry of the Lebanese army into the area (it will be supported by a bolstered UN force).

What's been achieved? Lots of rockets have been destroyed: at least the bigger ones, that is. In the end Hezbollah couldn't manage to hit Tel-Aviv. The smaller Katyusha rockets, more mobile, easier to hide and fire, are still there in abundance, ready to be pointed towards Israel and fired. Hundreds of Hezbollah militants have been killed, but there are still enough to strike Israel, and more than a hundred Israelis have been killed (see here for figures). Israel has set up a commission to investigate the prosecution of the campaign.

After proclaiming victory, and with the entry of the Lebanese army into the South, Hezbollah has started both to melt back into the scenery and to reemerge as a charitable agency aiding Lebanese Shiites with money and services, and gaining support there. There won't be any disarmament any time soon, but they have lost in terms of men, facilities and weapons.

The Lebanese people took the brunt of it, and, understandably, they're pissed. For those Lebanese returnees coming home to a flattened home, this is a calamity that came from outside, whether the fault of Israel, or of Hezbollah, or of the Bush administration in America (Israel's support and encourager). No gains for them (have another look here).

So everyone loses, regardless of what they said or thought. Nearly. Iran hasn't done so badly out of it all (see last post). Their uranium enrichment facilities are up and running, and the world's looking the other way. Sure, they've offered to talk about it, but they're not offering anything new that could lead to an actual cessation (as opposed to a suspension) of enrichment. And Ahmadinejad's emboldened enough to press Shiite militias in Iraq to step-up attacks (allegedly) and, once more, to call for an Israel-free Middle East.

All in all a bit of a cock-up.

---

Update:
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has published an online analysis of Hezbollah's motives. Read it here.

Israel, Hezbollah and Lebanon

You're probably wondering why I haven't mentioned Israel and Lebanon on this blog yet; that's because I'm convinced the whole situation is just a bloody mess, and there's not much hope for it. Hezbollah followed up an ill-conceived kidnapping with an idiotic but deadly bombing campaign of Northern Israel, while Israel has responded with disproportionate force, killing hundreds of civilians in Southern Lebanon, wounding thousands more, and tearing apart Lebanese infrastructure, including bridges, major roads, airport runways and power stations. Let's take a look at the aims and achievements of each side, starting with Hezbollah.

This mess emerged after Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid, at a time when Israeli was already desperately fighting in Gaza to rescue Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured by Hamas a little more than two weeks before. Israel's strikes in Gaza, and its foray back into that territory, still ongoing, have been massive.

Hezbollah's hope in capturing the soldiers was, like Hamas, of securing a prisoner exchange. As well as gaining prestige (for their ability to capture the soldiers), both Hamas and Hezbollah demanded the release of hundreds of prisoners in Israeli prisons in return for the soldiers. Such exchanges have precedents. Yet the response against Hamas, and civilians in Gaza, was massive: the strip's only power station was bombed, the flow of goods in and out was reduced to almost nothing, and Israeli aircraft have terrorised the population by strikes and sonic booms at night. In that light, how could Hezbollah expect different policies from Ehud Olmert's government? Such would have been an admission of defeat, and of being wrong in their actions against Gaza. Israel's recourse was to initiate strikes against targets in Lebanon, and later to send soldiers into the South of the country.

Following the Israeli reprisals, Hezbollah started launching rockets into Israel, including bigger, longer-range, and more accurate rockets than the small katyushas they've been pelting Northern Israel with for years. Haifa was the first target of these rockets, almost certainly Iranian-supplied Fajr-3 missiles. One of the rockets, which hit a railway depot in Haifa, killed eight and wounded dozens more, leading to further Israeli reprisals. It looked like an all-out war, and one in which Hezbollah couldn't possibly make any long-term gains.

[An alternative theory holds that Iran, Hezbollah's major backer, originally requested the abduction of the Israeli soldiers to divert attention from Iran's nuclear enrichment activities during the G8 summit. Loathe as I usually am to engage in such conspiracy theories—I favour cock-up theories as a rule—there may be some truth in that. Iran certainly has enough sway over Hezbollah, and did benefit from the predictable shift in spotlight.]

Regardless of the motives behind the abduction, and subsequent rocket-attacks, Hezbollah seemed destined to lose. Lebanese public support for Hezbollah initially wavered, with many asking why Hezbollah had invited the Israeli attacks on their country. Hezbollah was by many seen as an alien, Shiite, entity, sponsored by Iran and Syria, and so not representing Lebanon or the majority of the Lebanese people, particularly its Maronite Christians, Druze and Sunni populations. Yet soon enough, given Israel's response, support for Hezbollah in Lebanon was on the rise. Offered a view of Hezbollah from a perspective of the Israeli punishment (whether intended or not) of the Lebanese people, most Lebanese were utterly alienated by Israel, becoming more supportive of Hezbollah as a result. Perhaps Hezbollah made some gains in terms of support, but it now faces an existential threat stronger than anything with which it could threaten Israel.

As I have written above, the immediate response to the kidnapping by Hezbollah—the use of force—was pretty much a foregone conclusion. But not the scope or scale of force, with the runways of Beirut's airport being one of the first targets of the Israeli airstrikes. In the days that followed, the roads out of Lebanon, primarily to Syria, were bombed, as were more than sixty bridges in the country, power stations, and other infrastructure. The major price has been paid by Lebanese civilians. Hundreds have been killed in strikes on civilian infrastructure and Hezbollah strongholds, and hundreds of thousands have been made refugees, or have been left stranded in their homes by the strikes. Supplies and aid to the South of the country are trickling in painfully slowly over the battered roads made available for their delivery.

The reasoning behind this strategy is simple: drive Hezbollah out of Lebanon. Kill them, and destroy their stockpiles. Destroy the infrastructure to disrupt their movements and supplies, preventing further deliveries of rockets, ammunition, food and medicine. A secondary reason, and a possible explanation for the attacks' lack of proportion, could be the deterrence of potential adversaries. Against terrorists willing to be 'martyred', the thought that their people may also suffer could prove sobering.

Taken to their logical conclusion and beyond, the attacks on Hezbollah and Lebanon will not achieve their stated aim. While Israel has resolved to use more force, Hezbollah's support base has grown in proportion. And Hezbollah has threatened even longer-range rocket attacks, hinting at even greater missiles supplied by Iran. Even if Israel manages to remove the group from the area without sustaining too many losses, as soon as they withdraw Hezbollah will begin to return. Faces will change, methods will change, but they will still dangerous, and no less armed. A peacekeeping team, under UN auspices, will probably enter the area when activity ceases, but its effectiveness, even in a best-case scenario, would not be enough to prevent a clandestine resurrection. Lebanon will not be strong enough to retake control of its South in the foreseeable future, and all of the root causes of Hezbollah's existence will remain. This mess will be around for quite some time to come.

Summer weekends

You don't need me to tell you it's hot in Europe. These last couple of weekends I've been taking the opportunity to go into the countryside (Karlšštejn last week, Máchovo jezero this week) with the Prague Hash House Harriers. The Czech countryside is a few degrees cooler than Prague, and offers more activities like geocaching, running through dark places at night, running through steep rocky places during the day, falling down steep forested hills, swimming a kilometre to an island and back, and resting on the beach.

In between such events, I've been at home editing an article written by one of my co-workers. My flat is cooler than my office. It's nice to be able to work from home, but I'm looking forward to air conditioning in my next job.

North Korean motives

There's an excellent analysis of what's going on in Kim Jong Il's head here, courtesy of the Christian Science Monitor.

Time for a change

I'm pleased to announce my forthcoming career change to a position as Channel Program Analyst in Cisco's Prague office - a somewhat wide-ranging role assisting Cisco's Channel Sales Organizations in the Emerging Markets Theatre. The job's a big step up for me, and I'm looking forward to starting in September, or earlier if the IIR can let me go sooner.

This means less time for blogging in future, and less time for reading so widely on international affairs, but, on the other hand, more money and a brighter future.

Family stuff

Congratulations to my sister Emma, who was awarded a 2:1 for Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Oxford University!

Here's another picture of Manny, step-sister Penny's boy, now aged 5 months.

Normal coverage of international affairs will resume shortly, though I'll quickly applaud the decision to grant all US military detainees their rights under the Geneva conventions. It's not before time, and the US is no worse off as a result.

Cool, but useless

William Marshall has an excellent opinion piece in today's IHT, laying out exactly why America's steps towards a massively expensive space-based weapons program is a bad idea. Not only do such steps go against international norms and antagonise other nations but, more importantly, the military gains available for such heavy costs could easily and cheaply be rendered worthless by any half-capable potential adversary.

Flop!

After all the fuss in recent weeks about a possible test firing of a Taepodong 2 missile by North Korea, with some advocating an early strike against the launcher and others speculating on the consequences, they actually went ahead and did it.

Yesterday, North Korea lobbed a bunch of missiles, about six, although we're not sure, into the Sea of Japan. A few hours later, they threw in another one, for good luck. Most of these missiles were short and medium range, Scud-Bs and Hwasongs or Nodongs, although they did include one dreaded Taepodong 2, thought able to reach the US mainland (although only with a light warhead, and probably favourable weather).

Reactions were surprisingly consistent, with pretty much everyone agreeing that this was a provocation. The Japanese and South Koreans have most to fear from any kind of regional escalation, and would be likely targets of North Korea's missiles in an all-out war. Japan imposed sanctions on travel to and from North Korea in the aftermath. Japan also requested an emergency closed session of the UN Security Council.

Funnily enough, all is not lost. In fact, nothing is lost, except for North Korea. Japan's harder line will undoubtedly be followed by other parties in negotiations on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. North Korea's closest 'friend', China, will no doubt now be less friendly towards its embarrassing and destabilising neighbour, and other neighbours Russia and South Korea are hardly lining up in its defence.

Moreover, the actual tests were, overall, a failure. The abilities of the short and medium range missiles were known, their successful testing shows little other than traditional North Korean brinkmanship. The failure of the Taepodong 2, less than a minute after its launch, however, actually shows the feebleness of North Korea's technology, and by extension, its economy. So while North Korea will see a lot of negative repercussions from the tests, the possible positive—an increase in prestige and a strengthened hand in negotiations—spectacularly failed to materialise, to the sound of a very big belly-flop.

Whatever the future holds for the six-party talks, and for the North Korean regime, this was truly their loss.

---

Update:
The repercussions of this will go on for quite some time, it seems. While the UN Security Council has so far failed to produce any unified action, with China and Russia rejecting a strong resolution that could lead to sanctions, South Korea has piled on the pressure by suspending food aid to North Korea. This comes amidst fears that North Korea is preparing to test-fire another Taepodong missile. This is really just belligerent idiocy at its worst.

La Belle Dame Sans Merci

"O What can ail thee, knight-at-arms,
Alone and palely loitering?
The sedge has wither'd from the lake,
And no birds sing.

"O what can ail thee, knight-at-arms!
So haggard and so woe-begone?
The squirrel's granary is full,
And the harvest's done.

"I see a lily on thy brow
With anguish moist and fever-dew.
And on thy cheeks a fading rose
Fast withereth too.

"I met a lady in the meads,
Full beautiful—a faery's child,
Her hair was long, her foot was light,
And her eyes were wild.

"I made a garland for her head,
And bracelets too, and fragrant zone;
She look'd at me as she did love,
And made sweet moan.

"I set her on my pacing steed,
And nothing else saw all day long;
For sidelong would she bend, and sing
A faery's song.

"She found me roots of relish sweet,
And honey wild and manna-dew;
And sure in language strange she said,
'I love thee true.'

"She took me to her elfin grot,
And there she wept and sigh'd full sore;
And there I shut her wild, wild eyes
With kisses four.

"And there she lullèd me asleep,
And there I dream'd—ah! woe betide!
The latest dream I ever dream'd
On the cold hill's side.

"I saw pale kings and princes too,
Pale warriors, death-pale were they all:
They cried, 'La belle Dame sans Merci
Hath thee in thrall!'

"I saw their starved lips in the gloam
With horrid warning gapèd wide,
And I awoke and found me here
On the cold hill's side.

"And this is why I sojourn here
Alone and palely loitering,
Though the sedge is wither'd from the lake,
And no birds sing."

                                             ~John Keats (1820)

Nuclear non-proliferation

In the last part of the last entry, I covered the draft fissile material (cutoff) treaty presented by the US to the UN's Conference on Disarmament on May 18th. Arms Control Today offers an excellent analysis, putting the proposal in context.

On the same subject, Hans Blix last week published an editorial in the IHT, drawing attention to the stalled efforts to disarm nuclear powers, or at least to take existing nuclear weapons off hair triggers (where they're more vulnerable to almighty cock-ups). Blix also publicises the report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee (WMDC), which he headed, and that report's recommendations that the US ratify the CTBT as well as pursue the FissBan. America has resisted pressure to ratify the CTBT, essentially because they still hope to develop some mini-nukes (i.e. usable ones) at some point in the future.

---

Update:
For those of you interested in the obstacles facing nuclear disarmament, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in particular, there's an excellent article in this week's Economist on the subject.

And if anyone wants to read up on the background of the Fissile Materials (Cutoff) Treaty (FissBan), then the Nuclear Threat Initiative is the place to go.
-rp-

Long overdue

I'm horribly late with this update. Initially this was because I was too busy, but for the past couple of weeks it's been because I've consistently been between three and six days behind on the news. And there's been a lot of news.

Notable over here were the Czech elections, and surrounding scandals. Other stories have included the increased pressure on Hamas to compromise on its stance towards Israel (and a deadline extension), Islamist victories over the US-backed alliance of warlords in Somalia, and a sacking and political intrigue in the Kremlin.

In Iran, America has had something of a policy shift (towards diplomacy), and the EU has offered some new incentives, apparently including provisions that they can continue uranium conversion during talks, and hints that they might be able to continue some enrichment after a final deal. And, looking at the big picture, Mark Leonard (now working at the Centre for European Reform) says we have enough tools, and time, for diplomacy before considering airstrikes.

Gaining less coverage, quite a lot's been happening in North Korea, with a new economic deal with South Korea (dependent on the resumption of cross-border train tests), pressure from China for Pyongyang to resume disarmament talks, a final farewell from the company set-up to construct the light-water reactors promised in 1994, and worries about their improved missiles and possible testing.

However, all that aside, the real reason I started typing this blog entry was to post a link to this article, on the current state of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. With America's recent apparent (though doubted) shift to support a ban on the production of fissionable material (FissBan) useful for building bombs, perhaps there's still some hope for other cornerstones of the regime, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Then again, there's still a long, long way to go, and I'm just talking about the Americans' attitude to multilateral talks.

Although the FissBan proposal is a step forward, it is only a minor one: the proposal comes with a notable lack of verification procedures—sought by other parties to the talks—and a reiteration of America's wish to negotiate on this topic alone, while other states also seek to address other issues at the conference. As long as America refuses to even discuss, for example, the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS—it would prohibit part of the development of their missile defence programme, or "starwars"), the impasse will remain.

Czech malaise

I don't often write Prague-specific articles here, but in the last ten days a pretty compelling story has highlighted some of this country's worst problems.

May 1st saw the usual round of celebrations, protests and counter protests here, including a Neo-Nazi demonstration, a counter-demonstration by anarchists, and a peaceful demonstration against the former. Obviously the police maintained a strong presence to keep clashes to a minimum.

Some distance from the head of the Neo-Nazi march, and the main fighting with anarchists, Kateřina Jacques, Green Party MP and head of the government's Human Rights section, was asked to stop demonstrating by a policeman. Jacques was there with her two small children, and a few colleagues. She refused. The policeman, Tomáš Čermák, ripped a banner out of her hands, roughed her up, handcuffed her, dragged her about 20 metres, and shoved her into a police car with his baton. In front of her children and friends.

The policeman was not alone, of course. His colleagues acted to try to prevent onlookers from taking photos, without otherwise trying to intervene. All of this was caught on film by a Britské listy correspondent (site in Czech). Ms. Jacques was taken to a police station for questioning, and was given medical attention some time later, after demanding to be taken to a doctor. Čermák was suspended, although he maintains he did nothing wrong.

Prime Minister Paroubek called the action "inexcusable", saying Čermák "probably acted in a moment of mental aberration". Similarly, Interior Minister František Bublan called the action "inappropriate", and said the officer would be sacked if it was found he'd abused his power. The Prague town police insisted the policeman had reason to act, but admitted they weren't sure if his actions were legal. Čermák's colleagues laid the blame fully on him, stating that all other aspects of the operation were perfect.

All of which leaves a nasty taste in the mouth. The fact is, we probably wouldn't be hearing about this quite so much if Jacques wasn't an MP. After similar claims of "inappropriate" action ended the CzechTek rave last year (held on legally-rented land), a flood of media attention ended with, well, nothing. All charges against policemen were later dropped, even though police action then was much, much nastier than in this case (see here, here, here and here).

In this case, politicians' instinct was initially to blame the policeman's mental state, either temporary or permanent. And the police authority's instinct is also to talk in such terms, although in their case they point to his 20-years' experience in the police, and the psychological tests required of entrants to the police. Yet what of his colleagues? Plainly no-one in authority over here wants to face up to the utter lawlessness of the police here. Reports from Amnesty International consistently point to police brutality as one of the countries' worst problems, and, as any expat here will tell you, corruption is rife.

To get an idea of the typical Czech reaction, I emailed a few friends for their opinions. Typical comments indicated it's 'normal' for police to act like this against leftist demonstrators (not politicians). Many respondees stated the police are too tolerant of neo-nazis and skinheads but crack-down on assorted leftists - "the police protect a neo-Nazi demonstration and beat up someone else." One thought that this case, and others preceding, are unique examples from unique events, but are not necessarily indicative of any further (day-to-day) brutality. A couple included cynical suggestions that, given the handy presence of a cameraman and the forthcoming elections, this whole episode may even have been fostered by Jacques purposefully.

Not one of my respected and intelligent friends and colleagues directly mentioned the need for reform, or offered suggestions for such reforms. This passive acceptance of authorities' failings seems a particularly Czech malaise not reproduced elsewhere in the region. This ingrained submissiveness probably results from dominance by outside powers lasting hundreds of years - Austro-Hungary, Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia.

Given this situation, it's unsurprising that nothing's being done. The investigation is focusing on a small number of low-level "bad apples". Only after more than a week of pressure was anyone vaguely senior dismissed - the Prague-2 region police chief and deputy chief. A couple of other policemen have been punished, including the deputy chief for Prague and the commander of Čermák's unit.

It's unlikely the blame will spread further. The investigation is being run from the Interior Ministry's agency. Nothing like the UK's Independent Police Complaints Commission. Given that the Interior Ministry is responsible for the development of the police, don't expect any self-flagellation soon.

This country needs real reform. Getting rid of some bad apples doesn't change the mouldy box. For starters, police complaints should be investigated thoroughly by an authority completely independent of the police and interior ministry. Once institutional failings have been identified they can be addressed by comprehensive reforms. That will take time, perhaps a generation or more, but is absolutely imperative for a modern-day police force.

For such an independent complaints authority and subsequent reforms to succeed, the culture of corruption and police untouchability in day-to-day life must be addressed. Yet a prior requirement is for the Czech public en masse to take a firm stand against outrages, not merely to put up with it. Hopefully future generations, under liberal democracy, will develop the confidence to make such changes. I don't expect real, effective change for the foreseeable future.

rickphillipsuk

On-on!

I'm just recovering from setting the trail ('haring') Sunday's run for the Hash House Harriers. It was a great trail, if I say so myself, heading from Měchenice, via Sloup and Davle, to Pikovice, taking in some great scenery from forests and streams to hilly vistas including the Vltava river and Sazava tributary. The trail is set by leaving blobs, lines and circles of flour on the ground.

After the trail was set, my co-hares (Tamaron and Valentina) and I were too knackered to even make it back to the beer stop at Sloup to meet up with the runners, so we had a nice relaxing wait in Pikovice. It had taken us four hours, during the hot hours of the early afternoon.

The runners seemed to have enjoyed the run, and of course, gave us punishment drinks ('down-downs') for setting such an awful run, and for not even attending it. The traditional obscene songs were sung with spirit. Unfortunately I'm the usual 'hash flash' (photographer), and since I didn't do the run after setting the trail, there are no photos of the absolutely stunning countryside we went through. Ah well. I've marked the route on a satellite photo from Google Earth - you'll have to click on the image above to see it.

Iran, nukes, the UN and the USA

Time for an update on Iran, which continues to dominate the news, with their successful enrichment of uranium and the UN Security Council's deadline (28 April) for Iran to halt enrichment, as assessed by an IAEA report.

An additional offer from Iran to re-allow IAEA inspectors into the country, with a timetable for inspections to be drawn up in the next three weeks was unsurprisingly rejected by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as "playing games", while Colin Powell attributed Iran's intransigence as an acceptance that they can withstand any likely sanctions over the issue. Actually, the two views aren't irreconcilable, as suggested by the IHT (previous link): Iran may feel able to withstand the possible sanctions, but would still prefer to delay them as far as possible.

Regardless, Russia and China still look likely to veto any Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran, with Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki confident enough to announce this to the media. It's unusual for a foreign minister to comment on the supposedly secret foreign policies of other states, yet Russia and China seem to have forgone complaining about this, and have indeed resisted sanctions. The reasons for this seem to centre around fears of an ultimate American military action resulting from a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN, with Iraq still firmly in foreign-policy-makers' thoughts. Other considerations may include worries about disruption to oil markets and supply (China) and rather outdated perceptions of geopolitics and economic ties to Iran's nuclearisation and military development (Russia). In addition, I'd be tempted to attribute at least a small part of the support to the desire to follow a Middle-Eastern policy opposite to America's.

Mark Heinrich provides a solid analysis of Iran's perspective on this issue in an excellent Reuters article. Particularly worrying is the possibility that Iran may try to replicate their success enriching uranium at Natanz at other sites, underground and unknown, and the possibility that Iran could depart from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), becoming only the second country (after North Korea) to do so. Heinrich emphasises Iran's pride and need to feel secure, as well as their genuine feeling that they are being denied their right to civilian nuclear power. All of this, in Heinrich's view, suggests that the only way out without war or a nuclear Iran is diplomatic engagement by the US. A noble hope, but I'm far too cynical to expect it anytime soon. Heinrich draws a parallel with North Korea, and while the two countries have similar security fears, North Korea's history of nuclear developments show an intention to use them as bargaining chips, while Iran's actions indicate a desire for the bomb itself.

Reports this week claimed Iran had received a batch of 18 BN-25 missiles, developed from the Soviet SS-N6 supplied to North Korea after their decommissioning in Russia (see here). The missiles, ordered in February, have a range of over 1,500 miles, a significant improvement on Iran's Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 (in development) missiles, leading some analysts to speculate that the Shahab-3 will be phased out and work on the Shahab-4 will be halted.

Israel, probably the one country most troubled by the prospects of a nuclear Iran, launched a spy satellite from Russia to monitor the country, later applauding the satellite's excellent picture quality. Meanwhile, an Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander stated that Israel would be the first target for retaliation in the event of an American attack.

Unsurprisingly, the confrontation has pushed up the price of oil even further, to 75$. Although Iran has pledged not to further disrupt supply as a political tool (that would be cutting off its nose to spite its face), deputy oil minister Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian did suggest that prices may rise to 100$ per barrel as a result of the confrontation.

Essentially, Iran knows America's weaknesses, has guessed at the consequences, and decided to push for nuclear weapons. Both America and Iran are talking tough, but Iran seems to be holding most of the cards, with American diplomats lacking the support needed for a tough line, the American military tied up in Iraq and the American public less inclined to support future excursions.

Still, Iran will still take a good few years to perfect their enrichment techniques, and will then take at least another year to enrich enough uranium for a bomb in the worst-case scenario (or if you're Iranian, best-case scenario). That would be followed by a period developing, and ultimately testing, a nuclear warhead. And if that happens? American claims that the world won't tolerate a nuclear Iran are somewhat unfounded. The world already has an "Islamic nuclear bomb" (Pakistan), and an "evil rogue state" probably with a bomb (North Korea). Iran's bomb might just add some welcome stability to the region (see here), with extra caution in regional diplomacy and enough security and confidence for Iran to foster greater ties in the region.

Need I mention India and Pakistan? In July 1999 what seemed an inevitable re-run of the conflict over Kashmir was averted, with lots of nervous consideration of the nuclear consequences. Now there seems to be a new bus route between the two every few months, with confidence growing and prospects of a settlement of Kashmir still distant, but definitely rosier.

Although Iran has no rivalry as obvious as India and Pakistan, it has regional rivals (Israel, Turkey, Iraq) who could either put up enough of a fight to deter Iran, or who have friends who would be happy to do so, whether politically or militarily. Any likely sanctions from the actual use of a nuclear warhead would undoubtedly have the support of of the UN Security Council. Isolation, if not outright destruction, is not in Iran's interests, and they know it. While the bomb could have its advantages in terms of peace and security, its potential costs are as massively more unlikely as they are horrifying.

The military approach to preventing Iran's program is fraught with difficulties and potentially massive repercussions. Diplomatic engagement leading to a permitted civilian program would be the best solution, but forgoing that, I'd prefer a nuclear Iran to a horrible mess any day.

Bajofondo

I don't go to many concerts, but yesterday I went to the best I've been to in at least a couple of years. Thanks to my friend Kamila Xenie Vetišková (good name, eh?) I found myself in a nicely industrial space near Palmovka on the outskirts of Prague—the perfect setting for the Bajofondo Tango Club. It's hard to convey the sheer pleasure at experiencing such music—easiest described as a cross between tango and club dance music—played live. Bajofondo fuse tango into club music with a perfect feel for tango's mix of drama, passion and nostalgia.

The Prostor Abaton was not so crowded to prevent some Argentine tango dancing from myself, Kamila and Radka Šulcová (friend and teacher). I was the only male dancer present, with two of the very best female dancers in Prague. Sounds like a good ratio to me! We gave out a few leaflets at the end advertising the Entrelazados, and from the reactions from the crowd there, not to mention those from Radka and Kamila, I can say that my tango is now very nice indeed.

Those of you wishing I'd taken the time to write something about international politics: never fear. "Normal" service will resume shortly. R.

Mini update

Once again I've been busy going out and enjoying myself (lots of tango, and a nice 6-a-side football game last night), and this blog is due an update. Iran's still a big issue, with an editorial in the IHT from Zbigniew Brzezinski - thanks to Cara Lyn for the heads up.

I'm not working at CBW this week, so hopefully I'll catch up on all that unread news and write a proper entry in the next few days.

I've been listening to a couple of Vaughan Williams' symphonies. Highly recommended.

Iran Balls

Before I get on with it, a quick apology for being a little late with this. I knew it'd take a while, and had some serious aikido and tango dancing to get on with...

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No doubt you'll all have noticed the debate following Seymour Hersh's article in the New Yorker a few days ago charging that senior members of the Bush administration are seriously considering a strike against Iran, possibly including a tactical nuclear warhead ('bunker-buster') against the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. If you have the time, I suggest you read Hersh's article before my humble opinions...

The article draws upon and develops the theme from an article by Joseph Cirincione for Foreign Policy a couple of weeks ago exploring some US officials' apparent desire to go to war against Iran. The article was picked up by all the major news sources, including the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Telegraph, the Guardian and the BBC - so take your pic if you don't want to read the whole article by Hersh. The Arms Control Wonk also provides a nice in-depth exploration of the feasibility of using a nuke to destroy Natanz, and why (in his view) it won't happen.

My original view, not having read the piece or any more in-depth reports, was that this was a negotiating technique on the part of the Bush administration. Simple: make the Iranians think they're really going to be blown to smithereens and they'll be much more accommodating diplomatically. My worry then was that the negotiating bluff would manage to become policy -- obviously administration officials can't admit it's a bluff even in their own circles, because they need the bluff to be believed. Consequently, it's all too easy for such a move to make hardline policy as officials argue the case so much that it becomes a mindset. But I digress. Although the 'bluff' theory seems to be Iranian President Ahmadinejad's view (see above link to BBC article), after reading Hersh's article, and related ones, I'm now inclined to think that some officials actually think they could manage to (militarily) destroy the program once-and-for-all, and gain something by doing so.

One of the main themes of the various articles published has been the immense difficulty posed by destroying Iran's program so that it could not be restarted. These tend to focus on the types of weapons necessary, up to tactical nuclear earth-penetrating bombs that don't yet exist, and the types of targets, from a select few nuclear establishments scattered far and wide to every notable defence establishment including missile sites, airfields, and the like. Yet the danger here is that by focusing on such questions, leading to possible answers stating that it is possible (given a lot of effort), we tend to overlook the initial question of why. Hersh's piece states:

One former defense official, who still deals with sensitive issues for the Bush Administration, told me that the military planning was premised on a belief that "a sustained bombing campaign in Iran will humiliate the religious leadership and lead the public to rise up and overthrow the government." He added, "I was shocked when I heard it, and asked myself, 'What are they smoking?' "

Indeed. This is a serious error of logic. Picture this - your home town is attacked by another town with devestating effect. Even though you didn't really like most of the victims, a lot of the municipal property of the town and its defences have also been destroyed. Do you eject the town's elected leaders? Or do you rally around the leader, with the rest of your town, against the other town? Plainly such an attack would not cause the regime change some officials seem to hope for. The goal of regime change must also be questioned. Here's Hersh again:

The rationale for regime change was articulated in early March by Patrick Clawson, an Iran expert who is the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and who has been a supporter of President Bush. "So long as Iran has an Islamic republic, it will have a nuclear-weapons program, at least clandestinely," Clawson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 2nd.

This misses the point entirely. The link between the Islamic Republic and the nuclear-weapons program is just as strong as that between all potential leaders of Iran and the program. It is one of the few areas of Iranian politics on which there is a consensus -- largely a result of the constant threat posed by America, whether real or not. Such a drastic regime change does seem way over the top when you consider firstly that the program will take at least 10 years or so to make a bomb, and secondly that a lot of the Iranian public are already wary of the current leadership for forcing this crisis with America, and are fairly likely to vote for quite a different government at the next election. Unless, of course, they find some reason to rally around Ahmadinejad, that is...

Although Iran might lose its capacity to develop nuclear weapons from an American strike, we must ask: at what cost? Well, if one or more nukes are used, then at a massive loss of American prestige -- WMDs against Muslims, now, and a violation of one of the world's most sacred norms: against the use of nuclear weapons.

But what if only conventional weapons were used? Well, still the prestige drop: America attacks another Islamic oil-producing nation with massive force. Commentators have predicted a massive boost to international terrorism (think Hezbollah - see here and here) and a spike in oil prices, even if Iranian imports somehow continued unabated (unlikely). Either of these alone should be enough to deter an American attack (leading me to wonder again, what are they smoking?) The prestige drop would also damage the remaining European support for America (Jack Straw, Britain's Foreign Secretary already called the idea "nuts").

Then there's the cost. Without going into too much detail, the US military budget has been expanding to take in continuing operations in Iraq. Massive expenses are having a massive knock-on effect on the American (thus global) economy. Of course, there's also the costs in human life - both Islamic and American. If such a strike were not followed by any sort of nation-building or occupation (take yer choice), then the costs in American lives wouldn't be too high. But the cost of bombs and missiles, and of sending in 'spotter' teams of intelligence troops to identify and indicate targets, would be massive, and would need Congressional approval. Ah... approval. Something Bush has less of these days. Perhaps a strike against Iran could rally the nation around his administration? Or perhaps, with the recent defection of Francis Fukuyama from the neoconservative movement indicating a far-reaching sea change, such a strike, or even a hint that the administration wants to try it, could push the American public to loudly (and more importantly, intelligently - some hope needed) protest against it.

Basically, though, President Bush has insisted that they are trying diplomacy, dismissing the reports as 'wild speculation', although not saying anything to actually deny them or anything in them. Certainly the time is not ripe for such action, or even discussions of it. Watch this space. Or, if you want to hear about it more than 3 days overdue, try the BBC, IHT, etc., etc.

Saturday news summary

Had a busy week, with a couple of nice aikido classes at HC Sparta, and an excellent milonga courtesy of Valentina, who was celebrating her birthday in grand style at her flat.

Today I've been cleaning my own flat, and reading the IHT. Quite a lot's been happening, starting with the protests in Belarus' Oktyabrskaya Square being broken up and hundreds arrested - today's rally may gain some support, but the Americans' and Europeans' complaints and promised sanctions (against Belarus' elite) won't exactly change Lukashenko's mind. Not while the Russians are standing behind him, that is.

South of Belarus, Steven Lee Myers looks at the political situation in the Crimea, which is about two-thirds ethnic Russian and home to Russia's Black Sea fleet. Tomorrow (Sunday) will see parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the first since the Orange Revolution a year or so ago. For reasons largely similar to why I would have voted for Lukashenko in Belarus (see below), Yuschenko's supporters look likely to lose out to the pro-Russia bloc led by rival Viktor Yanukovich. It's a sacrifice of democracy in the name of economics, with the prospects of cheap Russian gas and trade deals. And in Ukraine, disillusionment with the failure of Yushchenko's government to deliver real positive change after the revolution in the face of many unrealistic hopes didn't help.

ETA, Basque separatists and (former) terrorists, declared a cease fire amid hopes for a future negotiated settlement, probably in line with the degree of autonomy just granted to Catalonia. The IHT draws parallels with the IRA.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made peace overtures to Pakistan while launching another bus service between the two nations. It'll be a long process at best, with Kashmir at the centre, but the time seems ripe for a diplomatic resolution in line with consultations of Kashmir's populations.

And finally, the French. This one had me laughing.

Belarus

After Sunday's election, and the unsurprising victory of strongman Viktor Lukashenko (Europe's last dictator) over opposition leader Alexander Milinkevich, thousands of protesters turned out into the main square (Oktyabrskaya Square) in Minsk to protest. Echoing the language and determination of Ukraine's Orange Revolution, opposition leaders cried foul, and looked set to stay in place until forcibly removed. Yet after three days their numbers dwindled into the hundreds, and some opposition activists were arrested. Lukashenko dismissed all talk of revolutions, and the riot police are at the ready.

Undoubtedly the election was fixed. Lukashenko isn't going to give up power until he wants to - his control over the state's forces is strong and his willingness to use them to repress dissent is solid. The EU has threatened more sanctions in response, and the US denounced the elections and demanded a re-run (unlikely, to say the least).

Yet this all misses the point. Even with the terrible human rights situation in Belarus, and even if 83% is far above Lukashenko's actual support, if I was a Belarussian living in Belarus, I would have voted for Lukashenko. Obviously this needs some explanation, but the reasons are quite simple and real. Belarus gets most of its energy in the form of gas, which it gets at roughly one-fifth of its market value from Russia. Furthermore, its economy, which is performing well, is massively dependent on trade with and investment from Russia. If Lukashenko were to go, all of that would be jeopardised. Russia has already shown itself willing to use gas as such a lever (see entries on Ukraine and Georgia). Moreover, the EU, and any other states, would not be willing or able to replace Russia as Belarus' sponsor, and would have a lot of trouble moving quickly enough to prevent an economic tumble if gas prices rose. Basically, if Lukashenko goes, the country's economy will crumble.

So what's to be done? Well, not much, unfortunately. The time is not ripe for change. Perhaps one day Russia will not want to pay so much to have Belarus under its wing, or internal changes will occur and replace Lukashenko naturally. It's hard to say. There's little hope - Belarus will just have to live with its dictator for the time being.