Progress, but of a different sort

The executive of the IAEA in Vienna finally managed to overcome some tough resistance, particularly from Russia, and pass a carefully-worded resolution whichsends Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran, naturally, isn't happy about this; its officials are threatening to bar future IAEA inspections and the parliament might refuse to ratify the NPT's Additional Protocol (the signing of which represented a major accomplishment for the EU3 towards the end of 2003).

The referral is no mean feat, and gives me some confidence that an agreement in the UNSC may not be as near-impossible as I'd thought. Iran's 'friends' in the council - in recent months it has cosied-up to China and Russia - now seem less likely to veto a resolution on Iran, and indeed some form of sanctions now look like a distant possibility, though their form and extent are anybody's guess, at least for the moment.

Yet this somehow misses the point. The real power of sanctions, as with all punishments, is not in their use, but in the threat of their use. A likely scenario for the UNSC debate on the subject is this: America wants strong sanctions which, for example, might target Iranian leaders, the economy, and of course the nuclear industry. The EU wants to focus more on the leadership and nuclear industry, and the Chinese and Russians are worried about any sanctions not directed expressly against the nuclear industry. [This involves a lot of guesswork, but while the issue might shift, the general postures will probably look something like this.] So my prediction is that months of careful diplomacy will produce a compromise which will scrape through the Council, offering some fairly weak sanctions to be used if Iran refuses one last opportunity to cease and desist. Iran probably won't, seeing as the sanctions aren't too damaging, and their nuclear activities will continue, albeit at a slower rate.

That's my prediction, in any case. The sanctions on offer will be too weak, and so will be used, whereas the threat of stronger sanctions might succeed and lead to their successful non-use. One of the main problems now is that the Americans seem to view the application of sanctions as a goal in itself. It may be true that extremely strong sanctions could cripple the Iranian economy and prevent its leaders from travelling abroad, but that in itself won't actually prevent Iran's nuclear development, and will only further enrage the Islamic world. On the other hand, this aggressive stance is perfect for making the threat credible. Strong sanctions are useful, but only as a threat and not as a tool.

A note of caution...

Finally, the US and North Korea managed some sort of compromise in the six-party talks in China, with the signing of a 'Statement of Principles' in which North Korea promises to give up its weapons and programmes, and the US reaffirms that it isn't going to attack North Korea. The statement leaves open the possibility for a light-water reactor, as well as the timetable for a North Korean return to the NPT, to be discussed in future. This has been heralded as victory for non-proliferation and for diplomacy (Mohammed ElBaradei called it proof that "diplomacy can work"). Obviously, all of the diplomats who had spent painstaking years on this thorny problem had a good reason to pat themselves on the back, too.

But the problem is far from resolved. Future talks are still necessary to firmly end North Korea's nuclear efforts, and the light water reactor could still cause difficulties, although a softening in America's rhetoric could precede a quiet shift on this issue. More worrying is North Korea's possible (perhaps probable) behaviour at future talks. The North Koreans won this statement, which affirms their arguments for having nuclear power and against American aggression at the cost of their nuclear programme(s), by their tried-and-tested brinkmanship. This method has brought gains for North Korea before (the 1994 associated agreement, brought to an end by North Korean cheating in 2002, is a case in point), and in addition to this statement also brought a recent promise of electricity supply from South Korea. Such gains give little hope that North Korea will abandon this method at future talks. There's still some distance to go.


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Added on 20 September, at 17:10

Post Script:
Even before 24 hours had passed this happens. The North Koreans are now saying that they won't give up their weapons until they have a shiny new power plant. It's probably just a preparation to squeeze extra concessions out of the USA in future talks. Ah well. Back to work.

Ach!

Just take a look at this.

And Another Thing

Things have been coming to a head recently regarding North Korea and Iran, and these two cases, separately but concurrently, have highlighted the failures of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and of the American and European policies in this respect.

The six-party talks hosted by China (which exist mostly as a multilateral cover for bilateral talks between the USA and North Korea) have once again hit a sticking point on the provision of peaceful nuclear power to North Korea (see here, here, and here); this time with the North Koreans asking for a light-water reactor. Disregarding for the moment the tricky questions of whether they deserve such a power plant, and who will actually pay for it, the North Koreans can claim legitimacy for this demand. The NPT (of which North Korea is not currently a party, but which broadly represents global consensus) reserves the right for states parties to develop nuclear energy, but not nuclear weapons. Yet North Korea, like Iran and many others before them, has previously used such civilian facilities as a front for weapons programmes, and is one of the least-trustworthy states around, leading to America's current refusal to allow even a light-water reactor, which would be much harder to use for producing weapons-grade material.

Iran, while probably 10-15 years away from building a nuclear weapon, has been more disquieting. Iranian politicians from the previous and current governments have repeatedly reiterated their claims the Iran has the right to develop nuclear weapons, and have also claimed the right to control the whole nuclear fuel cycle, sparking fears that the uranium by-product of their heavy-water reactor (being developed at Bushehr with Russian assistance) could be further enriched at Natanz and then used in nuclear warheads. Why is this more worrying? Basically, because the North Koreans have generally used their weapons programmes as bargaining chips, while the Iranian response to revelations about theirs has been a stubborn refusal to compromise, resulting in the resumption of uranium processing at Isfahan. This latter development largely derailed the negotiations with the EU3 (the UK, France and Germany), who had been trying to coax Iran away from such activities. Iran wants the weapons, not the fruits of any negotiations. So Iran may be referred to the UN Security Council by the IAEA, and may face sanctions, if both the Chinese and Russians do not use their veto. The Americans are, of course, pushing for such a development. However, the IAEA has been reluctant to make such a move, and the support of the Chinese and Russians is far from assured.

So, what is to be done? While many analysts decline to form policies on both cases together (given their separate natures) the cases both show the need for a new approach and new momentum in reform of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Americans, by far the biggest player in the arena, have largely rejected the NPT, given its failures and its acceptance of civilian power for all states parties, in favour of alternative methods. So India (not a signatory to the NPT) has now been rewarded with nuclear cooperation, and American pronouncements against both Iran and North Korea largely ignore the treaty. This manages to further weaken the treaty, which still remains the global consensus. Instead of seeking to treat potential weapons proliferators on a case-by-case basis, America should instead try to reform the NPT. No doubt this will lead to reiterations of calls for real disarmament from the nuclear powers (and not rearmament, see below) in the UN, but the USA would still be able to largely ignore such calls. With any hope, a stronger NPT would emerge, possibly incorporating the additional protocol (which bolsters the inspections side of things) as a mandatory feature, and possibly even restricting dodgy states' access to nuclear power (although definitions of dodgy remain elusive, and the possible supply of power to such countries from neighbouring states as a compromise would be extremely difficult).

Whatever the details of a future reform of the NPT, one thing remains: The USA can go it alone in their non-proliferation efforts, spending a lot of time and resources on each individual case. But if they want these efforts to be more effective, they need the world to go with them in prodcuing effective solutions to these problems; they need to shape global opinion by engaging wholeheartedly in a debate aimed at countering nuclear proliferation from a global, multilateral perspective. States developing nuclear weapons can afford to look away when America berates them; but they could not do so if America had the weight of global opinion behind them.

rickphillipsuk

Must Try Harder

In a draft document, the Pentagon has laid out its Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, which directs the circumstances under which the USA may use nuclear weapons. The document, expected to be signed within a few weeks, tries to satisfy the Bush administration's wish to bolster America's security by improving the deterrence of its nuclear arsenals. As such, it departs from the existing doctrine (laid out in 1995) by threatening preemptive strikes against enemies - state or non-state - preparing a strike using chemical or biological weapons, noting specifically that this would be an option against weapons facilities in hardened bunkers.

Two points come to mind. Firstly, while the draft points out that the deterrence must be credible, it still fails in this respect. Secondly, this doctrine actually seeks political gains by its failure to gain credibility.

While the theoretical prevention of an attack by biological or chemical weapons by a nuclear strike may seem plausible at first, such a strike would first require unfailing and unimpeachable intelligence: a stretch by all accounts. Even if the threat and targets were known, the prospect of striking such facilities with existing "very large, very dirty, big nuclear weapons", as Donald Rumsfeld called them, would almost certainly lead to unconscionable collateral damage. Picture the likely scenario after such an implausible 'success': the American government blows away a large chunk of foreign soil on an allegation of preparations for a WMD attack. Who would believe it's claims of impending destruction and a lack of alternatives? The president and government would likely be replaced at the next available opportunity. The draft doctrine has not been created for the use of current nuclear weapons, but (as its writers hope) for the use of future ones: particularly the 'bunker-busters', of which Congress has refused to allow development. The doctrine is worthless without the next generation of smaller, more capable nukes. And such weapons are not forthcoming, however much the doctrine tries to reshape political opinion in their favour.

This draft document both fails to perceive what is acceptable to the American public (as loosely represented by Congress), and what is possible using current intelligence and nuclear capabilities. Its deterrence fails alongside these stark inadequacies. Nuclear weapons will not, in the forseeable future, prevent a determined and capable enemy from attacking America with chemical or biological weapons. Hostile states are already deterred by the America's conventional forces. Terrorist cells, working amidst large civilian populations, will not be targeted by any large-scale weapons, conventional or not, and they know it. Such nuclear posturing is simply a waste of time.

Yaaaawn!

I've been incredibly tired since the weekend, when I went to a friend's country house, near Melnik, North of Prague. The 4 of us went swimming, hiking, and horseriding in the brilliant countryside, visited the Bezdez castle, and watched a DVD of An American In Paris. All of that - along with the milongas on Sunday and Tuesday nights - has kept me pretty-much worn out ever since.

So it shouldn't come as a surprise when I say I've not done anything particularly useful since then.