This is no way to run relations between states. For those who haven't heard, the two pipelines in North Ossetia carrying gas from Russia to Georgia, and an electricity pylon 120 miles away in Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, were sabotaged early on Sunday morning (BBC, CNN, Reuters). Georgia is suffering its worst winter in 20 years, with temperatures currently around -5°C. Georgian President Saakashvili put the blame squarely on Russia, pointing to recent threats from Russian officials and the careful orchestration involved in areas with large Russian military deployments. If you don't know the details, I suggest you follow those links now. The lack of a motive for Ossetian (or other) separatists to undertake such a specific attack, the inconsistency when compared with such groups' former targets, and the failure of any such group to come forward and claim responsibility all lead me to believe President Saakashvili's claims, compared with the reaction from Russia's Foreign Ministry.
I see this as a shocking disrespect of international norms and procedures, and as a blatant attempt from Moscow to influence the forthcoming privatisation of Georgia's pipeline, which Gazprom has expressed an unreciprocated interest in purchasing. A comprehensive article on the state of affairs between Georgia and Russia (via state owned gas monopoly Gazprom) can be read at Eurasianet.org). Gazprom badly wants to control Georgia's pipeline. On Friday RIA Novosti published two paragraphs from Georgia (scroll down to read them) in its monitoring of foreign news concerning Russia,. The stories argued that Gazprom wanted the pipeline to connect with Iran in the hope of building a cartel in the supply of gas to Europe. This fits in nicely with an article by Mark Almond in the Guardian, published on Saturday, claiming that Russia's energy influence is damaged by the route taking Caspian gas to Europe via Iran and Turkey. Almond attributes to this weakness Russia's 'loss' in the 'new cold war', citing the failure to gain influence over Ukraine at the end of 2005, and the prospects of further loss of influence over energy transit:
Ukraine's Orange revolutionaries repaid their western sponsors by switching the direction of the Odessa-Brody pipeline to suit US strategy last year. Around the same time, America and Britain were gloating over the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that cut Russia out of Caspian oil exports. Next they announced a trans-Caspian pipeline to suck central Asia's gas westwards without passing through Russia, let alone paying Putin transit fees. The west is making the running in global pipeline politics, not the Russians. In reality, the west advances as Russian troops retreat from the Caucasus and central Asia. Gazprom is upping prices to ex-Soviet republics to compensate for Moscow's loss of geopolitical clout.
Putin's regime seems willing to go to all lengths to try to
reverse its geopolitical fortune. But such moves are easily countered - Georgia is now receiving gas from Russia via Azerbaijan (see Civil.ge), a move made possible by Russia's claims of innocence. Meanwhile, the Georgians' resolve not to give in to Russian bullying will in all probability harden, and no doubt European governments will hasten their resolve to seek energy elsewhere (although supplies are pretty thin). With any hope the coming months will see a withdrawal of German co-operation on the Baltic Sea pipeline, which bypasses Poland (and Belarus) to take Russian gas direct to Germany. This pipeline would allow Gazprom (i.e. Moscow) massive leverage over Warsaw without jeopardising sales to Europe, as happened when they stopped supplying Ukraine. That, and the seeming inevitability of Russia's loss of its dominance over trans-Asian gas supplies, points to this move damaging Russia's influence rather than bolstering it.
Update:
News organisations seem to be giving this story surprisingly little coverage, and Western politicians are being suspiciously quiet. However...
Today's IHT covers the story with an extra warning from the Russian Foreign Ministry:
A Russian Foreign Ministry statement said in response to the Georgian comments that "this hysteria is accompanied by continued provocations against Russian servicemen in Georgia," where Russia still has military bases.
Among Georgian leaders, the statement said, "a mixture of dependency, hypocrisy and licentiousness has developed, multiplied by a feeling of impunity, in the hopes of finding patrons for its anti-Russian line.
"The desire to find external enemies to justify one's own helplessness in establishing a normal life in one's country has never led to anything positive," it said.
So - a reminder of the Russian bases in Georgia (keeping the status quo in separatist regions), of Georgia's dependence on Russia, its 'helplessness' without Russia, and it's recent attempts to move to the (anti-Russian) West. Barely anything about the explosions, just the implicit threats from the reminder of direct Russian power. Disgusting.
With Hamas' shocking victory in the Palestinian legislative elections this week, reporters and analysts have been wondering what's next for Palestinian politics, the peace process, and America's promotion of democracy in the Middle East. What's clear is that everything's unclear: Hamas did not expect to win an outright majority and have very few policies ready. Likewise the rest of the world was taken by surprise. So the largely secular population is worried about the possible imposition of Sharia, and the quartet (the UN, USA, EU and Russia) and Israel are flummoxed as to future peace negotiations. The consensus is that nothing will happen until Hamas softens it's approach. While Hamas will soften its approach as the pragmatic considerations of running a government take hold, it's too difficult at present to say how much further they might go in future. But they aren't going to renounce terrorism or recognise Israel any time soon.
