Progress, but of a different sort

The executive of the IAEA in Vienna finally managed to overcome some tough resistance, particularly from Russia, and pass a carefully-worded resolution whichsends Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran, naturally, isn't happy about this; its officials are threatening to bar future IAEA inspections and the parliament might refuse to ratify the NPT's Additional Protocol (the signing of which represented a major accomplishment for the EU3 towards the end of 2003).

The referral is no mean feat, and gives me some confidence that an agreement in the UNSC may not be as near-impossible as I'd thought. Iran's 'friends' in the council - in recent months it has cosied-up to China and Russia - now seem less likely to veto a resolution on Iran, and indeed some form of sanctions now look like a distant possibility, though their form and extent are anybody's guess, at least for the moment.

Yet this somehow misses the point. The real power of sanctions, as with all punishments, is not in their use, but in the threat of their use. A likely scenario for the UNSC debate on the subject is this: America wants strong sanctions which, for example, might target Iranian leaders, the economy, and of course the nuclear industry. The EU wants to focus more on the leadership and nuclear industry, and the Chinese and Russians are worried about any sanctions not directed expressly against the nuclear industry. [This involves a lot of guesswork, but while the issue might shift, the general postures will probably look something like this.] So my prediction is that months of careful diplomacy will produce a compromise which will scrape through the Council, offering some fairly weak sanctions to be used if Iran refuses one last opportunity to cease and desist. Iran probably won't, seeing as the sanctions aren't too damaging, and their nuclear activities will continue, albeit at a slower rate.

That's my prediction, in any case. The sanctions on offer will be too weak, and so will be used, whereas the threat of stronger sanctions might succeed and lead to their successful non-use. One of the main problems now is that the Americans seem to view the application of sanctions as a goal in itself. It may be true that extremely strong sanctions could cripple the Iranian economy and prevent its leaders from travelling abroad, but that in itself won't actually prevent Iran's nuclear development, and will only further enrage the Islamic world. On the other hand, this aggressive stance is perfect for making the threat credible. Strong sanctions are useful, but only as a threat and not as a tool.